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THE 'LOUGHBOROUGH SCHOOL' IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Over the past twenty-five years, the 'Loughborough School' has been at the forefront in establishing discursive psychology (DP) as a key method for social psychologists. Citation counts show that it has had remarkable influence in social psychology specifically, and across the social sciences more broadly. Since its inception, however, DP has also been at the centre of controversial debates between proponents of different kinds of qualitative work (let alone its battles with traditional quantitative psychology). Two worries have been expressed. First, by adopting conversation analysis (CA) as its primary perspective, DP has been criticized for its alleged pointless empiricism; its dangerous adoption of relativism; its focus on nothing but the text, and its failure to deal with subjectivity (for examples of such criticism, see Frosh, 1999; Parker, 2005: 91-92 ; for replies, see Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1995; Edwards, 2006; . Secondly, DP's preference for recordings of actual interaction, as opposed to retrospective interviews (which it treats as more interaction) has been criticized by those researchers who take as their primary data what people say in interviews and focus groups (e.g., Griffin, 2007) -often under the aegis of 'psychosocial ' and, particularly, 'thematic' or 'intepretative phenomenological' analysis (see Attenborough & Stokoe, frth.; Benwell & Stokoe, 2006) .
There is a feeling, therefore, in some qualitative quarters, that CA-informed DP ignores power, politics, wider contexts and big pictures; indeed, that its adherents have somehow managed to find themselves 'on the wrong side' politically and ideologically. Some warn:
"Beware the Loughborough school!". This worries and upsets us. In this brief paper, we want to make two points, in an attempt to set the record straight and make a positive case for what DP/CA offers; for what it is, and what it is not. First, we want to show, via three empirical case studies, how DP/CA can be a powerful tool for social change, by studying contexts in which the politics of our applied interventions are, at least, reasonable and progressive.
Second, we want to claim that DP/CA projects are scientific: rational, objective, theoretically coherent, empirically-based and open to public scrutiny. They are both qualitative and largescale methods that examine the anatomy of members' practices in single-case analyses (e.g., Schegloff, 1987) , whilst also identifying, across large datasets, robust patterns in the social actions that build our relationships and identities (Attenborough & Stokoe, frth.) . Both these things make DP/CA exciting and rigorous, and its influence is testament to its appeal.
Applying Conversation Analysis and Discursive psychology
DP and CA are powerful tools for implementing social change, particularly when the matter at hand comprises recurring interactional business. Doctors deal recurrently with patients, therapists with clients, parents with children; through talk and embodied conduct in interaction. DP/CA identifies, minutely, how interaction works; how actions are accomplished (how doctors solicit patient histories, how therapists manage client resistance, how parents attend to children's eating habits). It is primarily and fundamentally a social science: it is about illuminating basic interactional mechanisms. But it can be applied, too.
DP/CA can reveal where interactional practices go 'wrong', and how they might be put 'right'. Indeed, DP/CA recommendations will be an order of magnitude more precise and detailed than the kind of generalized advice one sees in text-books; based on folk theories or experiential reports of interaction, or on simulated encounters ("use open-ended questions"; "listen actively", etc. see Stokoe, frth.) . As Peräkylä and Vehvilainen (2003) argued, practitioners' own 'stocks of interactional knowledge' may well be incomplete or even faulty.
Since DP/CA comes to the data open-mindedly and without agendas, its anatomy of talk is finer, and it has a sophisticated sense of the relationship between the actions to be accomplished and the conversational structures that accomplish them. If one wants to encourage someone to talk freely, for example, the term "active listening" is too imprecise to capture the subtleties of how that is actually done in real talk, and how a person can come across as engaged, supportive and attentive. DP/CA can supply that subtlety.
The following section provides examples of application from projects that each of us has been involved with: neighbour dispute mediation; child protection helplines, and dealings between support staff and adults with intellectual disabilities. After those descriptions, we will conclude by discussing the risks of intervention, and how they might be confronted. appearances, tendencies and dispositions) became relevant to the dispute. I wanted to discover which identities appeared in people's complaints; their salience, and their relevance to the persistence or resolution of conflict (e.g., Stokoe, 2006; 2009; 2009 ).
INTERACTIONAL INVENTIONS: THREE CASE STUDIES
In the 'base' project, neither the practices of the institutional parties to these interactions (mediators, police officers, and council workers) -nor impact upon their practices -were a particular focus. Nevertheless, salient observations were reported to practitioners at regular feedback sessions, which evolved into training workshops using a role-play method I developed (Stokoe, 2011 ; the 'Conversation Analytic Role-play Method': CARM). CARM takes live calls from members of the public into mediation centres as the basis for role-play discussion. Because mediation training is done via traditional role play, mediators seldom, if ever, study their own practice with real clients. CARM works like this:
1. Data extracts are identified in which particular interactional problems arise, or in which 'successful' outcomes (e.g., a client agrees to mediation) are accomplished. it is important that 'callers' are converted into 'clients' of the mediation service; it is only once an initial interview has been arranged that mediation 'proper' has started. We join this call after the caller (C) has explained her 'noisy neighbour' problem and the mediator (M) has explained the process of mediation. Having analyzed many such calls, I found that it is often after such explanations that mediators begin to 'lose' potential clients. In response to M's question about whether mediation sounds "like it might be helpful", C's turn follows a classic 'dispreferred' format for turning down an offer: it is delayed, it starts with an appreciation ("it might be") and offers an account (C is "not too sure"... about "seein' this: girl, at all,": lines 4-6). But M makes a second attempt to convert 'caller' into 'client', constructing a declarative that attributes a moral-characterological disposition to C:
"but you'd be willin' t'see two of our mediators jus' t'talk about it" (lines 45-46). This is a productive move: C accepts enthusiastically (line 9). Thus M upends a rejection-implicative trajectory by appealing to C's reasonable and moral character: it would be quite difficult for C to deny her 'willingness' to 'just talk' with a mediator (with no strings attached). Having secured acceptance into the first stage of mediation, M moves on to make arrangements. Note on lines 2-3 that the caller delays her response, by both pausing and stretching the delivery (across∷). At the end of her turn on line 3, we can make two further observations: an upward pitch change on 'long' and aspiration through the word 'thhime'. In an environment where there has been no upset up to now, these small features of delivery are sufficient displays of upset for the CPO to respond with sympathy on line 5 -her 'continuer' 'Mm' is delivered with a pitch shift upward and a stretch: the whole thing sounds 'sympathetic'. A delay of 3.5 seconds ensues, followed by the CPO's quietly delivered 'take your time', a turn which licenses the caller's lack of elaboration at this point. After longer delay the caller recycles her prior turn on line 11, her delivery hampered by nasal blockage. The CPO then topicalises the upset on lines 13-14, formulating features of the caller's mental states, identified as one element of 'empathic receipts' (Hepburn & Potter, 2007) .
This close attention to detail is not an analytic fetish impeding our understanding of the participants' thinking; rather, it illuminates precisely those specifics of delivery that are important for the participants. As this extract shows, CPOs take these features seriously and, as Hepburn (2004) noted, when they miss them things can start to go wrong. If we wipe these features from our transcripts we lose their emotional embodied delivery. But this is not to assume that we can see emotion 'behind' the talk. By taking discursive practices rather than emotions as primary, we move away from seeing emotions as inner objects that influence behavior and are perceived by looking inwards, to seeing them instead as public, social entities that have a role in getting things done (see Edwards, 1997) . In addition, we move away from the abstract concerns of experimental psychologists and start to consider issues that arise as important for people in their everyday lives.
A common complaint that DP/CA encounters is that our work seems to be all about talk, and little bits of it at that. Surely we are missing the big picture: the feelings of the caller, or the vulnerable children that are the whole point of it all? How might it actually help the NSPCC do their job? First, and most specifically, this kind of study provides an analytically-grounded account of why problems might appear in calls such as this, and therefore suggests directions for how CPOs might counter them. As Hepburn (2006) argued, this research starts with the orientations of the participants -it begins with what the participants themselves treat as crying. It is not attempting to improve on the understanding that is embedded in these practices; rather it is trying to make that understanding explicit and track its organization. Tracking these different elements of crying shows us just how subtle
Child Protection Officers can be in identifying and responding to callers' upset. As such this type of analysis helps DP researchers to develop training aids that can allow CPOs themselves to "step through digitized calls with analytic observations and suggestions about them" (Hepburn & Potter, 2003: 195) .
Secondly, this research has a broader theoretical aim, which is to contribute a different vision of the way emotion can be understood in psychology. DP studies of this kind show the way that issues and actions which we understand as emotional can be tractable to interaction analysis. This broader intellectual and scientific debate about how persons and psychological issues should be conceptualized and analysed is fundamental in psychology and social science. The outcome will be hugely influential not simply for research, but for the way disciplines such as psychology input into social services, health, education, organizations and so on.
A telling moment from a support staff member's dealings with a resident with intellectual disabilities: Charles Antaki
Like my colleagues, I came to Loughborough because of DARG. Although I had been happily employed elsewhere, in one of the UK's most liberal and open-minded Departments of Psychology of the time (the eighties and early nineties), it still felt dull and constraining for anyone wanting to work with language. DARG promised exciting times, and so it proved.
The strand of its work that fired me up was CA. CA is a demanding and technical business, five adults with intellectual disabilities who lived together in a shared house, and the staff who supported them 4 (e.g., Finlay, Walton & Antaki, 2008; Antaki, Finlay & Walton, 2009) .
One practice that struck us was the staff members' ways of offering choices to the residents:
'offering choice' has become a priority in welfare services, conscious that vulnerable people have traditionally had very little choice in the way they get support, and indeed even in the small decisions that make up the round of the normal day. But the staff, in trying to ensure that residents have a full range of alternatives to choose from, would often use conversational strategies that led only to confusion. Indeed, they sometimes seemed to prompt residents to suppose that their original choice was simply wrong, and to change their mind in the face of a repeated query. For example: By capturing such fleeting (but consequential, and frequent) moments, CA allowed us to throw light on the kinds of things that routinely happen in the rather closed world of a residential institution. The practices we identified were a source of bother and frustration to staff and residents alike, and our feedback sessions suggested that there could be a productive dialogue between researchers and practitioners. The application of CA won't be easy, and practitioners will always have their own agendas to worry about; but the grain of the data, and the specificity of what we could say, will give our recommendations an enviable face validity.
WHOSE SIDE ARE WE ON? THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION
In this paper, we have shown how large-scale discursive psychological and conversation analytic research can work in ways that deal with the 'big pictures' of people's lives. We are not 'taking sides' with or against our participants (see Antaki et al, 2003) as a short-cut to
analysis; yet in the selection of our settings to study, we are making choices relevant to emancipatory projects (e.g. see Antaki, 2011; Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007 , for collections of CA/DP studies in which the complexities of application are considered). Like most DP/CA researchers who find themselves in contact with agencies who might want to use our findings, our partnerships arose in part by chance and in part by a long and sometimes difficult period of negotiation. Usually it is we who make the overtures to groups of people in which we have a tentative interest, and who might fund our research. As Antaki (2011) puts it in a recent chapter on applied CA, "CA is not yet in the phone book, and has not reached the point where calls come in from outside agencies wanting CA help. Rather, it is the CA researcher who sees the possibility of working in collaboration with others to solve a problem, and do some funded social science in the process".
So far the kind of agencies we have been involved with are 'socially responsible': the children's help-line is officially a charity and so must conform to legal definitions of promoting a social good; support services for people with intellectual disabilities are, again, legally committed to the well-being of the people they serve; and mediation agencies offer non-bureaucratic, even-handed support to disputing parties. We are aware that these descriptions could be countered, or at least that a critic could object that in each case we are seeing the provision of service from the point of view of the provider, not the client. Our response is that our analyses focus on interaction, meaning the orientations of all parties must be analysed. This allows us to develop a practical and procedural understanding of the needs and concerns of clients in these organisations, as well as insights into the institutional specificity of the actions performed by service providers.
Finally, in the spirit of this special issue of BJSP, we want to acknowledge our colleagues in DARG, who together have provided our intellectual home for the past decade and longer, and with whom we have developed our academic identities. We are proud of DARG and its achievements, and hope that this paper has taken a small step in perhaps countering the notion that one should 'beware the Loughborough School'.
